Epicurus' old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is be both able and willing? whence then is evil? (David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere, and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (J.L.Mackie)
What is the result of recognizing that the proposition 'God is omnipotent' does not mean that God can do anything that is logically possible? It is not, as Mackie and Process theologians assume, to limit God's power, or to say that limited power is all God has. To say that, one would have to be able to make sense of the notion of 'unrestricted power', and I have denied that possibility. Even analytic philosophers say that it is no restriction of God's power to say that he cannot do what is logically impossible for him to do. If it is logically impossible for God to ride a bicycle, that is, it makes no sense to talk of him doing so, not being able to ride a bicycle is no restriction on God's power. (D.Z. Phillips)
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